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11 Introduction
The present paper considers rationing problems as synonymous with bankrupt-
cy and cost allocation problems, see e.g. Moulin (2002). With respect to
solution methods for such rationing problems we shall focus on axioms of
inequality preservation well-known from income inequality theory, see e.g.
Moyes (1989, 1994). In terms of the rationing model, inequality preserva-
tion in gains (losses) means that whenever one claims vector is more equally
distributed than another, in the sense of Lorenz-domination, then the corre-
sponding gains (losses) vector is also more equally distributed.
We consider rationing methods that are continuous and order-preserving
in the sense that gains and losses are ordered like the ordering of claims, and
demonstrate that the proportional method is the only rationing method that
p r e s e r v e si n e q u a l i t yi nb o t hg a i n sa n dl o s s e s .
As noticed in Young (1987, 1988) the rationing model has a dual inter-
pretation in terms of taxation where the sum of the taxes collected should
equal a given revenue constraint. In this case the interpretation of inequality
preservation is that when pre-tax incomes become more equally distributed
then both post-tax incomes and taxes must become more equally distributed
as well. Our result therefore also concerns a characterization of the ﬂat tax
by inequality preservation.
Inequality preservation may also be construed in terms of manipulability:
If a given rationing method is inequality preserving in both gains and losses,
then no lower coalition (ranking players according to claims) may gain by
equalizing or spreading their claims respectively in the sense of the Lorenz
ordering. Our result therefore relates to earlier results characterizing the pro-
portional method by non-manipulability in Moulin (1987) and Chun (1988)
who consider arbitrary reallocations, and to de Frutos (1999) and Ju (2003)
who consider manipulation by merging and splitting of claims resulting in a
variable number of agents.
22 The model
A rationing problem is given by a monetary value E>0t h a th a st ob e
shared among a ﬁxed number n ≥ 3 of agents with non-negative claims
c =( c1,...,c n)w h e r eE ≤ C, and C = c1 + ...+ cn.
Given a rationing problem (c,E), a solution is a vector x ∈ Rn
+ such that
x1 +...+xn = E and 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci for all i.Arationing method is a function
ϕ that assigns to every rationing problem a unique solution x = ϕ(c,E). For
example, the proportional method is deﬁned as ϕP
k (c,E)=ckE/C for k =
1,...,n. We restrict attention to rationing methods meeting the following
two (standard) requirements:
Continuity. A rationing method is continuous if it is continuous on
every subdomain {(c,E)|c ∈ Rn
+,0 ≤ E ≤ C}.
Order-preservation. A rationing method is order-preserving if ci ≤
cj implies ϕi(c,E) ≤ ϕj(c,E)a n dci − ϕi(c,E) ≤ cj − ϕj(c,E), for all
i,j ∈ {1,...,n}.
Order-preservation was introduced in Aumann and Maschler (1985) and sim-
ply means that gains and losses should be ordered like the claims.1
Note that order-preservation implies the natural property of “equal treat-
ment of equals” (ETE), i.e. ci = cj ⇒ ϕi(c,E)=ϕj(c,E).
Let c and c  be (weakly) increasingly ordered claims vectors with C = C 
(where C  = c 
1 + ... + c 
n), then c Lorenz dominates c  if
c1 + ...+ ck ≥ c
 
1 + ...+ c
 
k,k =1 ,...,n− 1,
Lorenz domination induces a partial ordering written as c  L c .I n
economic terms, c  L c  can be interpreted as the claims of c  being more
1In terms of the tax model order-preservation means that post-tax incomes as well as
the taxes themselves should be ordered like the pre-tax incomes.
3spread out (more unequally distributed) than the claims of c.U s e o f t h e
Lorenz ordering in economics dates back to the beginning of the 20’th century,
see e.g. Dalton (1920). Marshall and Olkin (1979) provide an elaborate
mathematical treatment.
If c and c  are two distributions for which C = C , ck = c 
k for k  = i,j,
ci ≤ cj and c 
i ≤ c 
j then if ci <c  
i we say that c  is obtained from c by an
equalizing bilateral transfer and c is obtained from c  by a spreading bilateral
transfer. For arbitrary c and c  where C = C , it is well-known that c  can
be obtained from c by a ﬁnite sequence of equalizing and spreading bilateral
transfers.
3 Inequality preserving rationing
Ar a t i o n i n gm e t h o dϕ is:
Inequality Preserving in Gains (IPG) if, for any E and c   L c
that ϕ(c ,E)  L ϕ(c,E).
Inequality Preserving in Losses (IPL) if, for any E and c   L c
that c  − ϕ(c ,E)  L c − ϕ(c,E).
The immediate interpretation of these axioms relates to inequality preser-
vation (as indicated by the names). However, due to order-preservation, they
may also be construed in terms of manipulation: Suppose some lower coali-
tion of agents (in terms of the size of their claims relative to the other players’)
equalize their claims leading to a new claims vector that Lorenz dominates
the original claims. Now, IPG requires that such a reallocation is not disad-
vantageous for this coalition. Consequently, if a rationing method satisﬁes
IPG then it cannot be manipulated by any lower coalition spreading their
claims (without changing the rank of the agents). Likewise, IPL concerns a
spread of claims: If a rationing method satisﬁes IPL then its solution cannot
be manipulated by any lower coalition equalizing their claims. Hence, if a
4rationing method satisﬁes both IPG and IPL then no lower coalition can
manipulate the solution by spreading or equalizing their claims.2 Note that
the axiom of No-Advantageous-Reallocation (NAR) used in Moulin (1987)
and Chun (1988) concerns reallocations within arbitrary coalitions. In this
sense, IPL and IPG together are weaker than NAR.3
Theorem: A continuous and order-preserving rationing method ϕ satisﬁes
IPG and IPL if and only if ϕ is the proportional method.
Proof: It is straightforward to show that the proportional method satisﬁes
IPG and IPL. We prove suﬃciency. We let E and C be ﬁxed, and consider
the restriction of ϕ to the domain {c | c1 ≤ ...≤ cn,c 1 + ...+ cn = C} and
demonstrate below (Steps 1-5) that a method ϕ satisfying IPG and IPL on
this domain is the proportional method. The theorem then follows immedi-
ately since E,C and the order of claims was arbitrarily chosen. Moreover,
when IPG and IPL are invoked we implicitly use order-preservation.
Step 1: First we claim that for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n−2, the gains (ϕ1(c,E),...,ϕk(c,E))
depend only on (c1,...,ck).
Indeed, let 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2a n dl e tc and c  be two claims vectors with
C = C  where ci = c 
i, i =1 ,...,k. Since ci = c 
i, i =1 ,...,k, c  can be
obtained from c by a ﬁnite sequence of equalizing and spreading bilateral
transfers between agents {k +1 ,...,n}. It is therefore suﬃcient to show that
an equalizing or spreading bilateral transfer between agents {k +1 ,...,n}
leaves the gains of agents {1,...,k} unchanged. Hence, assume that c  is
obtained from c by either such transfer.
2Concerning the rationing model, axioms of inequality preservation were originally
introduced in Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen (2001) where it was demonstrated that the
Constrained-Equal-Awards method satisﬁes IPG and the Constrained-Equal-Loss method
satisﬁes IPL whereby the Talmud method satisﬁes neither.
3We do, however, focus on order-preserving methods which is not the case in Moulin
(1987) and Chun (1988).
5Consider an arbitrary h where 1 ≤ h ≤ k, a n da ne q u a l i z i n gt r a n s f e r .
By IPG we have ϕ1(c ,E)+... + ϕh(c ,E) ≥ ϕ1(c,E)+... + ϕh(c,E). By
IPL we have (c 
1 − ϕ1(c ,E)) + ... +( c 
h − ϕh(c ,E)) ≥ (c1 − ϕ1(c,E)) + ... +
(ch − ϕh(c,E)). If h =1w eh a v eϕ1(c ,E)=ϕ1(c,E), hence assume that
1 <h . Likewise by IPG and IPL we get that ϕ1(c ,E)+...+ ϕh−1(c ,E)=
ϕ1(c,E)+...+ ϕh−1(c,E), implying that ϕh(c ,E)=ϕh(c,E). Hence
(ϕ1(c,E),...,ϕk(c,E)) = (ϕ1(c ,E),...,ϕk(c ,E)) which proves the claim.
If the transfer is spreading, all inequalities are reversed and the same
conclusion is obtained.
Step 2: Likewise, we claim that for any 3 ≤ k ≤ n,t h eg a i n s( ϕk(c,E),...,ϕn(c,E))
depend only on (ck,...,cn).
Let c and c  be two claims vectors with C = C  where ci = c 
i, i = k,...,n.
Since ci = c 
i, i = k,...,n, c  can be obtained from c by a ﬁnite sequence of
equalizing and spreading bilateral transfers between agents {1,...,k−1}. It is
therefore suﬃcient to show that an equalizing or spreading bilateral transfer
between agents {1,...,k−1} leaves the gains of agents {k,...,n} unchanged.
Hence, assume in the following that c  is obtained from c by either equalizing
or a spreading bilateral transfer.
Consider an arbitrary h where k ≤ h ≤ n, and an equalizing trans-
fer. By IPG, ϕ1(c ,E)+...+ ϕh(c ,E) ≥ ϕ1(c,E)+...+ ϕh(c,E). By IPL,
(c 
1−ϕ1(c ,E))+...+(c 
h−ϕh(c ,E)) ≥ (c1−ϕ1(c,E))+...+(ch−ϕh(c,E)).
Since c 
1 + ...+ c 
h = c1 + ...+ ch we get ϕ1(c ,E)+...+ ϕh(c ,E)=
ϕ1(c,E)+...+ϕh(c,E). Likewise by IPG and IPL we get that ϕ1(c ,E)+...+
ϕh−1(c ,E)=ϕ1(c,E)+...+ϕh−1(c,E), implying that ϕh(c ,E)=ϕh(c,E).
Hence (ϕk(c,E),...,ϕn(c,E)) = (ϕk(c ,E),...,ϕn(c ,E)) which proves the
claim.
If the transfer is spreading, all inequalities are reversed and the same
conclusion is obtained.
Step 3: We now claim that for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2, if for h<k ,ϕh = ϕP
h,t h e n
we have ϕk = ϕP
k .
6By contradiction: Assume that for some claims vector c there is k such
that ck > 0, ϕh = ϕP
h for all h<kand ϕk(c,E)  = ϕP
k (c,E).
Since ϕh = ϕP
h for all h<k ,t h e ns i n c eC is ﬁxed, let
ˆ c =( c1,...,c k−1,
ck + ... + cn
n − k +1
,...,
ck + ... + cn
n − k +1
).
Consequently, ϕ(ˆ c,E)=ϕP(ˆ c,E)b yE T E .
Now, let (c1,...ck−1)b eﬁxed. By Step 1, ϕk depends only on ck (written
ϕk(ck)) and deﬁne ek(ck) ≡ ϕP
k (c,E) − ϕk(c,E), i.e. the excess of player k
relative to proportional allocation.
It was shown above that ek(
ck+...+cn
n−k+1 )=0a n db yE T Eϕk(ck−1)=
ϕk−1(ck−1)=ϕP
k−1(ck−1), i.e. ek(ck−1) = 0 (with the convention that ck−1 =0
if k =1 ) . B yc o n t i n u i t yo fϕ,e k(ck) is continuous in ck, hence there is
ck−1 ≤ c 
k ≤ c  
k ≤
ck+...+cn
n−k+1 such that ek(c 
k)=ek(c  
k) = 0 and either ek(ck) > 0
for all c 
k <c k <c   
k or ek(ck) < 0f o ra l lc 
k <c k <c   
k. In the following we
restrict attention to the case ek(ck) > 0 for all c 
k <c k <c   
k; the other case
can be dealt with in a similar manner.
We claim that c  
k  =
ck+...+cn
n−k+1 . Indeed, assume to the contrary that c  
k =
ck+...+cn
n−k+1 , and consider the distribution

























By Step 2, ϕn depends only on E, C and cn and deﬁne en(cn) ≡ ϕP
n(c,E) −
ϕn(c,E). By ETE we have ϕk(4 c,E)=... = ϕn−1(4 c,E) < ϕP
k (4 c,E), hence
en(cn) < 0f o ra l lcn where c  
k <c n <c   
k +( n − k)(c  
k − c 
k).
Now, consider the distribution
4 c














k)=0a n den(c  
k +[c  
k −c 
k]) < 0, and ϕh = ϕP
h for all h<kwe have
ϕh(4 c ,E) < ϕP
h(4 c ,E)f o ra l lk<h<n . However, for the distribution
4 c

















7obtained from widetildec  by equalizing the claims among agents {k+1,...,n}
we have ϕh = ϕP
h for all h ≤ k. By ETE and the fact that en(cn) < 0 for all
c  
k <c n <C− c1 − ... − ck−1 − (n − k)c 
k we have ϕh > ϕP
h for all h>k—a
contradiction.
Therefore, let c  
k <
ck+...+cn
n−k+1 . In the following let c  
k be the highest ck for
which there exists a pair (c 
k,c k) satisfying ek(c 
k)=0 ,e k(ck)=0 ,e k(ˆ ck) > 0,
for all c 
k < ˆ ck <c k.H e n c e ,i fcn <C− c1 − ... − ck−1 − (n − k)c  
k we have
en(cn) = 0. Now consider the distribution




k − ε,C− c1 − ... − ck−1 − (n − k)(c
  
k − ε)).
Then we can select ε suﬃciently small such that c  
k >c   
k −ε >c  
k and for the
distribution
4 c
  =( c1,..,c k−1,c
  
k − ε,
(n − k − 1)(c  





(n − k − 1)(c  




obtained from 4 c by equalizing the claims of agents {k +1 ,...,n} we have
ck + ... + cn
n − k +1
<
(n − k − 1)(c  
k − ε)+C − c1 − ... − ck−1 − (n − k)(c  
k − ε)
n − k
<C − c1 − ... − ck−1 − (n − k)c
  
k.
By ETE we have ϕk(4 c,E)=... = ϕn−1(4 c,E) < ϕP
k (4 c,E), and ϕn(4 c,E) >
ϕP
n(4 c,E). However, for the distribution 4 c  since
ck + ... + cn
n − k +1
< 4 c
 
n <C− c1 − ... − ck−1 − (n − k)c
  
k,
we have en(4 c 
n) = 0hence by ETE ϕh(4 c ,E)=ϕP
h(4 c ,E)f o ra l lh>k .B u t
then ϕk(4 c ,E)  = ϕP
k (4 c ,E), i.e. agent k is the only agent for which the gain is
not equal to proportional allocation — a contradiction. We therefore conclude
that ϕk(c,E)=ϕP
k (c,E)f o ra l lc and E,1≤ k ≤ n − 2.
Step 4: We now claim that if ϕk = ϕP
k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n−2, then ϕn = ϕP
n.
8By Step 2, ϕn depends only on E, C and cn.I f ϕn  = ϕP
n then there
is c =( c1,...,cn)a n dE such that ϕn(c,E)  = ϕP
n(c,E). Now, deﬁne c− =
c1+...+cn−1
n−1 ,and consider the distribution c  =( c−,...,c−,c n). By ETE ϕ1(c ,E)=
... = ϕn−1(c ,E), and because ϕn(c ,E)=ϕn(c,E)  = ϕP
n(c,E), we have
ϕ1(c ,E)  = ϕP
1 (c ,E) contradicting Step 3.
Step 5: Finally, by Step 3, for 1 ≤ h ≤ n − 2w eh a v eϕh(c,E)=ϕP
h(c,E)
for all c and E, and by Step 4, ϕn(c,E)=ϕP
n(c,E) for all c and E. Hence
ϕn−1 = ϕP
n−1(c,E)f o ra l lc and E. We therefore have ϕ = ϕP which concludes
the proof. 2
Remark: The characterizations based on inequality preservation found in
Moyes (1989, 1994) restrict attention to tax methods where the post-tax
income of agent i is independent of the other agents pre-tax incomes. For
example, in this context, Moyes (1989) shows that an axiom similar to IPG
uniquely characterizes linear tax methods (Theorem 2.1).
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